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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO. 44530
)
v. ) KOOTENAI CO. NO. CR 2015-17195
)




STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Deborah Ann Fairchild pleaded guilty to one count
of burglary.  The district court withheld judgment and placed Ms. Fairchild on probation
for four years.  Mindful of the precedent holding that a defendant must challenge a
probation term in district court in order for such an issue to be considered on appeal,
Ms. Fairchild asserts that the district court erred when it ordered that Ms. Fairchild’s
probation officer would have discretion over whether she worked full-time or attended
school full-time.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In October of 2015, Coeur D’Alene police were dispatched to a Macy’s store
regarding an alleged shoplifting incident.  (Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI),
p.22.)1  Ms. Fairchild was confronted as she was leaving the store with several items.
(PSI, p.22.)  Subsequently, she was originally charged with one count of burglary and
one count of grand theft.  (R., p.52.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, she pleaded guilty
to burglary.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.15-20.)  In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the grand
theft charge, recommend local jail time and supervised probation.  (Tr., p.4, Ls.13-22.)
The State also agreed that it would not object to a withheld judgment.  (Tr., p.4, Ls.22-
23.)
At the sentencing hearing, the district court withheld judgment and placed
Ms. Fairchild on probation for four years.  (Tr., p.37, Ls.5-8; R., p.61.)  The district court
ordered that Ms. Fairchild would “make every effort to maintain full time employment or
be enrolled in a full time educational program,” and her probation officer would have
discretion over whether she would maintain full-time employment or attend school.
(R., p.63; Tr., p.38, Ls.17-22.)  Ms. Fairchild filed a notice of appeal that was timely from
the district court’s sentencing disposition.  (R., pp.65-67.)
ISSUE
Did the district court err when it ordered that Ms. Fairchild’s probation officer would have
discretion over whether Ms. Fairchild would attend school full-time or work full-time?
1 All citations to the PSI refer to the 72-page electronic document.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Ordered That Ms. Fairchild’s Probation Officer Would
Have Discretion Over Whether Ms. Fairchild Worked Full-Time Or Attended School Full-
Time
Ms. Fairchild struggles with significant mental health problems and admitted that
she was not in her “right mind” when this incident occurred because her dog had died,
and she had stopped taking her medications.  (See PSI, pp.22, 30; Tr., p.29, Ls.17-25,
p.31, L.1 – p.32, L.7.)   Mindful of the precedent holding that challenges to the validity of
probation terms will not be considered on appeal if they were not first raised in district
court, State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 530 (Ct. App. 2001) (citations omitted),
Ms. Fairchild asserts that the district court erred when it ordered that her probation
officer would have discretion over whether she attended school full-time or worked full-
time.
“The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an opportunity to be
rehabilitated under proper control and supervision.” State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452,
454 (1977) (citations omitted).  Therefore, “[t]he terms of probation must be reasonably
related to the purpose of probation, rehabilitation.”  Id. Whether a term of probation
meets this standard is reviewed de novo. State v. Jones, 123 Idaho 315, 318 (Ct. App.
1993) (citation omitted).
Ms. Fairchild asserts that the district court erred when it ordered that her
probation officer would have discretion over whether she attended school full-time or
worked full-time because giving her probation officer such discretion was not reasonably
related to her rehabilitation.  First, in light of Ms. Fairchild’s mental health problems, her
probation officer could not reasonably determine whether further education or
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employment would promote her rehabilitation.  Second, Ms. Fairchild has acknowledged
that she has trouble maintaining steady employment because of her mental health.
(PSI, p.27.)  Finally, the facts of this case do not indicate that Ms. Fairchild is in need of
rehabilitation in the way that term is typically used in criminal cases.  This was
Ms. Fairchild’s first felony conviction, and she was 54 years old when she committed the
crime.  (PSI, pp.20, 23-24.)  Moreover, she admitted that the crime was a result of
failing to take her medications and a mental health breakdown.  (PSI, p.22; Tr., p.31, L.1
– p.32, L.7.)  In fact, the State said that “the root of her issues are really mental health
issues,” and her counsel explained that he did not think the standard sentencing goals
applied to someone in Ms. Fairchild’s position.  (Tr., p.29, Ls.1-16.)
Therefore, Ms. Fairchild is not in need of rehabilitation to curb some criminal
impulse or substance abuse problem.  Indeed, when she is properly medicated, it
appears she needs no “rehabilitation.”  (See Tr., p.30, Ls.1-6.)  However, any probation
terms that require her to either attend school or find employment, should be at the
discretion of a mental health professional, not her probation officer.  Therefore, giving
her probation officer discretion over such matters was not reasonably related to her
rehabilitation and may indeed jeopardize her probation as she may not be an
appropriate candidate for either option.  As such, the district court erred when it
imposed this term of probation.
5
CONCLUSION
Ms. Fairchild respectfully requests that this Court remand her case to the district
court with orders to issue a new sentencing disposition, which does not contain this
term of probation.
DATED this 6th day of April, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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